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Abstract 
This study aims to investigate the role of government auditing to restrain corruption. 
Hereby, it focuses on the effectiveness of performance of the Indonesian Finance and 
Development Supervisory Agency, known as Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan 
Pembangunan (BPKP) as the internal auditor institution of the Indonesian President. The 
results show that BPKP fraud audit finding of irregularities has a positive relationship with 
the corruption level in Indonesian provinces. Data are used from provincial-level 
governments over the period 2012-2015 which produces 128 province-year observations. 
The study result shows that the irregularities found by BPKP fraud audit influence the level 
of corruption in the Indonesian provinces. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
Many countries face the problem of 
corruption which can endanger the 
economy of those countries. A recent study 
by Transparency International (TI, 2017) 
placed Indonesia on the 90th position of the 
176 countries surveyed. The Indonesian 
score was 37 whereas the average score of 
all investigated countries was 43. This 
indicates that Indonesia is perceived as a 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on a thesis entitled “The Influence of Government Fraud Audit Efforts on 
Corruption Level in Indonesian Provinces” published at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam in 2017 as 
part of the joint master’s degree program between Universitas Indonesia and Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam 
country with a high level of corruption. 
Another study estimates that the state 
financial loss because of corruption in 
Indonesia was around IDR 31.077 trillion 
in 2015 (ICW, 2016). 
Indonesia has 34 provinces with 508 
cities and counties (Indonesian Ministry of 
Home Affairs, 2015). Each province, city, 
and county has the authority to manage its 
own finance and performance (Indonesian 
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Law Number 32 of 2004 about Local 
Government). The law was released to 
support the decentralization as one of the 
Indonesian public sector reforms. By 
giving the local governments autonomy to 
organize themselves, the Indonesian 
government assumes that decentralization 
can accelerate the development of the 
economy in each local government. 
Furthermore, the regions can increase the 
national development. 
However, several problems appear 
because of decentralization. Rodrigo et al. 
(2009) describe that creating regulations in 
the local government with the same high 
quality as in the state government become 
one of the challenges in the decentralized 
country and also the problem of corruption. 
According to Maravic (2007), 
decentralization shifts corruption from the 
state to local government level, so-called 
decentralization of corruption. Rinaldi et 
al. (2007) also assume that corruption in 
regions can increase because of 
decentralization. Also, decentralization 
can create ‘money politics’ on the election 
of governors and mayors.  
Indonesian law prescribes that each 
local government has to report their 
financial and performance each year 
through a financial report. This report is 
audited by an external audit institution by 
giving an opinion according to the public 
sector accounting standard. The local 
governments are also audited by the 
internal audit institution for their financial 
and performance management. These 
audits are conducted to maintain good 
governance of the local governments 
through transparency and accountability. 
Setyaningrum (2015) argues that society 
can use the financial report of local 
governments as a monitoring tool to 
evaluate performances of local 
governments. 
The government audit function in 
Indonesia can be distinguished into 
external and internal audit institutions. The 
Supreme Audit Institution or Badan 
Pemeriksa Keuangan (BPK) is the external 
audit institution. BPK conducts a financial 
audit and gives an opinion on the financial 
report of local governments. They also 
conduct the performance audits and special 
purpose audits. Local governments and 
central government have their own internal 
audit agencies that conduct audit, except 
financial audit of the financial report. The 
task of the internal audit institutions is to 
ensure that the internal control system of 
the government has been implemented as 
requested by Indonesian Government 
Regulation number 60 of 2008. 
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Corruption, as described by 
Indonesian Law Number 31 of 1999 about 
Act Crime of Corruption article 2 and 3, is 
an unlawful act that enriches people or 
others and causes financial state loss. It 
means the act of corruption can be 
prosecuted if it causes loss to the financial 
state. Corruption acts in Indonesia can be 
investigated by The Indonesian 
Commission of Corruption Eradication or 
the Indonesian Police or the Indonesian 
Prosecutor institution. The investigators of 
law enforcer institutions can prosecute the 
act of corruption and calculate the loss of 
state finance by themselves or ask another 
institution that has the competency and 
professional expertise in calculating the 
state financial loss through audit 
investigations or audit of calculation state 
financial loss. 
The study of Liu and Lin (2012) 
empirically investigates the role the 
Chinese government has in auditing. Using 
panel data in Chinese provinces from 1999 
to 2008, it analyses how fraud detection 
and the follow-up measures contribute to 
the fight against corruption. The result 
shows that there is a positive relationship 
between the corruption level in Chinese 
provinces and the number of irregularities 
found in government auditing. Another 
result is that the corruption level has a 
negative correlation with the post-audit 
rectification effort. Masyitoh (2014) 
studies the impact of audit opinion and 
findings by BPK on corruption perception 
in Indonesian local government. The 
results show that there is a negative 
relationship between BPK’s audit opinion 
of local government financial reports and 
the perceived level of corruption. 
Audit institutions have a role in 
corruption eradication. The need of audit 
becomes crucial for resolving agency 
problems. An audit is a monitoring tool by 
which a principal can detect irregular 
behaviour by an agent. The policeman 
theory, as discussed in Hayes et al. (2014) 
states that the society calls for audits 
because it wants irregularities on 
government expenditures to be detected. 
BPKP as an internal audit institution has 
several tasks as required in the Indonesian 
President Regulation number 192 of 2014. 
BPKP has to evaluate the implementation 
of the government internal control system 
and fraud control system that can prevent, 
detect, and counteract corruption. BPKP 
can perform investigative audits, perform 
state financial loss calculation audits and 
provide expert testimony regarding the 
irregularity that gives an indication of 
corruption. 
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The research question that arises 
from this discussion is to what extent the 
irregularities found in BPKP fraud auditing 
influence the level of corruption in 
Indonesian provinces. However, there 
could be reverse causality between audit 
fraud detection efforts and level of 
corruption. In the more corrupt places, the 
audit institution will put more effort to 
detect the irregularities. Hence, the further 
question is to what extent the corruption 
level in Indonesian provinces can influence 
the effort of BPKP fraud auditing. 
 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Government fraud audit 
The development of audit services 
can be described from various sources. 
Hayes et al. (2014) discuss the policeman 
theory which explains the demand and 
delivery of audit services. This theory 
emerged from a public perception that the 
responsibility of an auditor is to reveal 
fraud, which is similar to a cop. However, 
audit can also be seen as a verification of 
correctness and fairness of the financial 
statements. Fraud cases revealed recently 
become critical consideration that the duty 
of auditors in fraud detection and reporting 
back to the perception of when the 
policeman theory first appeared. The 
society wants to make sure that the funds 
collected from taxes and other sources are 
well managed. Therefore, the auditor is 
expected to detect irregularities from 
government expenditure. 
Elder et al. (2013) distinguish three 
kinds of audits: (1) operational audit; (2) 
compliance audit; and (3) financial audit. 
The State Financial Inspection Standards 
contained in the Indonesian Supreme Audit 
Institution Regulation Number 01 of 2007, 
makes a distinction based on the type of 
examination (audit). The first audit is a 
financial audit which gives an opinion on 
financial reporting. The second audit is a 
performance audit whose aims are to check 
the aspects of performance effectiveness, 
efficiency, and economy in the 
management of state finances, examining 
the internal control system of government 
and the compliance with laws and 
regulations. The last is a specific purpose 
audit, which includes investigative audits. 
According to Indonesian Law Number 15 
of 2004, the investigative examination is 
part of the examination for a particular 
purpose and implemented to reveal 
indications of fraud that may cause loss to 
the state and the presence of criminal 
elements. 
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The theory of such audit services in 
policeman theory shows that people expect 
the auditor can detect fraud and can expose 
it. According to DeAngelo (1981), audit 
quality can be defined by the ability of the 
auditor to identify and report a breach in 
the accounting system of audited entity. In 
government auditing, Zhao (2005) 
describes the factors of government 
auditing quality, which are technical 
factors, independence factors, and 
administrative factors. Particularly, the 
administrative factors are defined by 
determining the nature of irregularities, 
producing the right decisions and 
monitoring the rectification works. Special 
expertise is required to disclose fraud 
because it is hidden. According to 
Singleton and Singleton (2007), the reason 
why financial auditors could not detect 
more fraud is because many people and 
Congress members in U.S. believe that a 
financial audit is not adequate to detect 
fraud. A survey from KPMG and ACFE 
Report to Nation shows that the financial 
auditor can identify only about 10% of 
fraud (Singleton and Singleton, 2007). 
Fraud audit is believed to be more effective 
to detect fraud than financial audit because 
it is more intuitive whereas financial audit 
is more deductive even though both are 
important in the audit. 
According to the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiner (ACFE, 2002), 
"Fraud examination is a methodology for 
resolving fraud allegations from inception 
to disposition. More specifically, fraud 
examination involves obtaining evidence 
and taking statements, writing reports, 
testifying findings and assisting in the 
detection and prevention of fraud." It 
means that the fraud examinations (audits) 
are ways of audits regarding to the 
searching of evidence, reporting, and 
giving testimony based on the findings 
related to the fraud detection and 
prevention. 
The BPKP Code Assignment of 
Investigation (2012) states that the audit of 
financial loss of state is an audit to express 
opinions regarding the value of the state 
financial losses arising from the alleged 
irregularities and used to support litigation. 
It can be concluded that the audit 
performed by BPKP auditors to detect 
irregularities and giving the testimony in 
the court shows that they had implemented 
forensic accounting in helping law enforcer 
institutions to reveal corruption. 
 
Corruption 
There are many definitions of fraud. 
The Association of Certified Fraud 
Examinations (ACFE, 2002) classifies 
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fraud to the: (1) fraudulent financial report; 
(2) asset misappropriation; and (3) 
corruption. Fraud has three axioms 
according to Tuanakotta (2007), fraud is 
always hidden, proof of fraud can be done 
from opposite side, and fraud occurred is 
only determined by the court. 
Corruption can arise and persist 
when it meets three conditions, which are 
discretionary power, economic rents, and 
weak institutions (Adit, 2003). The famous 
quote ‘power tends to corrupt and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely’ shows that 
power can create the possibility for rent-
seeking and the institution with the weak 
internal control system can encourage 
government officials that have authority 
producing rents. Therefore, corruption is 
connected with the abusing power to get 
own benefit. 
In Indonesian Law number 31 of 
1999 jo Law number 20 of 2001 regarding 
Corruption Act Crime Eradication, 
corruption is classified into several types 
including causing state financial loss 
(article 2 and 3), bribery (article 5, 6, 11, 
and 12), embezzlement (article 8, 9 and 
10), manipulation (article 7 and 12), 
extortion, conflict of interest in the 
procurement, and gratification (article 12). 
The competency of the auditor in 
supporting law enforcement institutions 
such as Corruption Eradication 
Commission, Police Department, and 
Prosecutor Institution, to eradicate 
corruption can be done through the 
irregularities found in government auditing 
report. According to Liu and Lin (2012), 
government auditing can play an important 
function to decide if the collection and 
spending of public funds is in accordance 
with the laws and regulation, to detect if 
there is any misconduct in management 
regarding the budgets, and to report the 
irregularities found in the audit report. Law 
enforcement institutions in Indonesia 
regarding corruption eradication can use a 
government fraud audit report from an 
audit institution to support their 
investigation of corruption crime acts. 
Particularly the report can be used to 
determine if state financial loss occurred 
and to assist the judges in determining 
economic verdicts. 
 
Hypothesis development      
A study of Liu and Lin (2012) 
examines the functions of government 
auditing in the provincial government in 
China from 1999 to 2008 to detect and to 
report irregularities that can potentially be 
fraud. Several factors are identified as 
potential determinants of corruption, 
namely market development, education 
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level or human capital, public officers’ 
income, government size, and openness. 
The conclusion of the study is that audit 
findings in the previous year are positively 
related to the level of corruption. The more 
irregularities/fraud detected by the 
auditors, the higher the indication of 
corruption is. Another conclusion is that 
the rectification effort post audit is 
negatively related to the level of 
corruption. It shows that the more 
rectification effort after audit, the less 
corruption. However, Masyitoh (2014) 
investigated the influence of the audit 
opinion, the audit findings,  and follow-up 
audit on the corruption perception, and 
found evidence that there is no relationship 
between the audit findings in the internal 
control system weakness and the 
perception of corruption. 
In their study, Liu and Lin (2012) 
mention factors that determine corruption. 
Market development of the province is 
expected to be negatively related to the 
level of corruption. The higher the market 
development of a province, the lower the 
level of corruption of a province. 
Education level is also assumed to have a 
negative relationship with corruption. The 
higher the level of education in a province, 
the less severe corruption will be in that 
province. The public official's wage also 
plays an influential role in bureaucrats’ 
reasons to corrupt. The higher the public 
official's salary, the less motivation there is 
to show corrupt behaviour. Government 
size is expected to be a vital determinant 
affecting corruption, but in some studies, it 
has a different impact on the corruption 
level. The openness of the province for 
international trade is also assumed to be a 
determinant of corruption. The more 
openness in a province, the lower the level 
of corruption there will be. Masyitoh 
(2014) also adds opinion audit as a 
determinant of corruption. The higher the 
audit opinion acquired by the local 
government, the less corruption happened 
in that region. 
According to the Indonesian 
Supreme Audit Institution Regulation 
Number 01 of 2007, there are four opinions 
generated by BPK on local government 
financial audit, i.e., adverse, disclaimer, 
qualified, and unqualified opinion. An 
unqualified opinion is assumed to be the 
highest opinion in the financial report 
because it shows that the financial 
reporting presented by the local 
government is in accordance with fairness 
in all material respects and related to the 
corruption level in the region. A qualified 
opinion is acquired when the auditors can 
obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence 
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and conclude that misstatements are 
material but not pervasive. An adverse 
opinion is obtained when the auditors can 
acquire sufficient and appropriate evidence 
and conclude that misstatements are 
material and pervasive. A disclaimer 
opinion is obtained when the auditors 
cannot acquire sufficient and appropriate 
evidence. Therefore, the undetected 
misstatements can be both material and 
pervasive. 
In Indonesian Law, corruption is 
considered as an unlawful act that causes 
financial loss to the state by enriching the 
perpetrators or others. Gong (2010) 
explains that government auditors are 
required to detect fraud in government 
spending and activities and the misuse of 
government assets. Gong (2010) also states 
that the number of irregularities shows the 
effectiveness of audit institution to detect 
fraud. The number of corruption cases and 
irregularities found describe the quality of 
governance in the public sector.  
From the aforementioned 
publications and our analysis, we define 
our hypothesis as follows: 
 
BPKP fraud audit finding of 
irregularities has a positive 
relationship with the corruption 
level in Indonesian provinces. 
 
According to the literature review 
and the hypothesis stated above, the 
irregularities found in government fraud 
audit have a close relationship with the 
level of corruption. However, there may be 
a two-way relationship between them. 
Management improvements in the audit 
institutions will be forced when the 
potential corrupt bureaucrats get pressure 
from the misconduct exposure of audit 
institutions in the previous year. On the 
other side, in the more corrupt place, the 
more fraud will be detected, but this also 
will cost more effort. It means that 
government auditors can detect more 
irregularities in a higher corruption places. 
Therefore, we also perform a model to test 
whether fraud audit finding is influenced 
by the level of corruption. 
The study of Liu and Lin (2012) 
mentions factors that affect a number of 
irregularities in government fraud audit 
findings, such as openness, market 
development, amount audited, auditor, 
reports, and newsletters delivered by local 
audit institutions. The number of 
irregularities is positively related to the 
total amount audited. The larger the 
amount of money audited, the more 
irregularities can be found. Auditors 
become the most critical element in the 
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government auditing. The more auditors in 
the local audit institution, the higher the 
possibility that they can detect fraud. 
Reports from local audit institutions is 
related to the problems found, suggestions 
for improvement, and rectification 
solutions for audited institution. When the 
leading government officials, higher audit 
institutions or related departments adopt 
these reports, there will be more incentives 
for auditors to prepare these reports and for 
audited institutions to improve the 
performance. We also add an audit opinion 
factor that is assumed to be related with 
fraud audit finding. The higher the audit 
opinion received by the local government, 
the fewer irregularities are found in 
government fraud auditing. 
 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study follows the papers of Liu 
and Lin (2012) and Masyitoh (2014) and 
uses data from multiple sources: 
a. Fraud audit reports of financial loss of 
state calculation by the BPKP 
representative offices in each 
Indonesian province for the years 
2011-2015. 
b. Corruption case rulings by the 
Indonesian Supreme Court for the 
years 2012-2015. 
c. Financial audit reports of local 
governments containing an audit 
opinion by the Indonesian Supreme 
Audit Institution or BPK for the years 
2011-2014. 
d. The economic growth level, education 
level, relative wage of public officials, 
final government consumption, the 
total amount of imports and exports, 
number of employees and the total 
amount of fiscal revenue and 
expenditure in Indonesian provinces 
from the Indonesian Central Bureau of 
Statistics for the years 2012-2015. 
e. The number of auditors in BPKP 
representative offices in each 
Indonesian province for the years 
2012-2015. 
This study obtains data from 2012 to 
2015 because corruption crime courts in 
most of the provinces in Indonesia have 
been established in that period. Population 
data in this study is extracted from all local 
governments and the study collects 
samples data from provinces that have all 
complete data needed. 
This study adopts models from the 
research by Liu and Lin (2012). However, 
we made some adjustments. First, we 
employ audit opinion as a control variable 
as in the study of Masyitoh (2014) in our 
models. Second, we removed the report 
and newsletter delivered variable as the 
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determinant factor of fraud audit in the 
model 2 as in the Indonesian setting, this 
data is not available. The models are shown 
as follows: 
 
Corruptit = β0 + β1FrAuit−1 + β2AuOpiit−1 + β3Growthit + β4Educit +
β5Wageit + β6Govsizeit + β7Openit + β8Marketit +  year + εit             
    (1) 
FrAuit = β0 + β1Corruptit + β2AuOpiit−1 + β3Openit + β4Marketit +
β5Amountit + β6Auditorit + year + εit                (2)
 
Corruptit = Corruption level in province i, in year t 
FrAuit−1 = Fraud audit finding in province i, in year t-1 
FrAuit = Fraud audit finding in province i, in year t 
AuOpiit−1 = Audit opinion in province i, in year t-1 
Growthit = Economic growth level in province i, in year t 
Educit = Education level in province i, in year t 
Wageit = Relative wage of public officials in province i, in year t 
Govsizeit = Government size in province i, in year t 
Openit = Openness in province i, in year t 
Marketit = Market development in province i, in year t 
Amountit = Amount audited in province i, in year t 
Auditorit = Number of auditors in province i, in year t 
Year = Year dummies 
ε = Error
 
The operational variables of 
this study are presented as follows: 
1) According to Liu and Lin (2012) 
corruption level in a province is 
measured by the number of 
corruption cases in the province 
that is investigated by law 
enforcement. The study of 
Masyitoh (2014) uses the 
Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) released by Transparency 
International for this variable 
Indonesia. In this research, the 
corruption level is measured by 
the number of appeals filed of 
corruption cases from the 
Supreme Court of the years 2012-
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2015 as in the study of Monika 
(2015) and aggregates this to a 
total number for all local 
governments in a province. 
2) Irregularities found in fraud audit 
reports in Liu and Lin (2012) are 
measured by the logarithm of the 
findings’ values divided per 
capita. In this study, we follow 
Masyitoh (2014) and use the 
number of fraud audit reports of 
BPK as an external audit 
institution. However, this study 
uses the BPKP fraud audit reports 
as an internal audit institution and 
aggregates the total number for all 
local governments in a province. 
3) The audit opinion has a significant 
impact on the corruption level in 
many studies such as Masyitoh 
(2014), Setyaningrum (2015), 
Monika (2015) and Ekasani 
(2016). In this study, the audit 
opinion variable is measured by 
the total audit opinion acquired by 
local governments multiplied by 
the rank of audit opinion from the 
highest unqualified (4), qualified 
(3), disclaimer (2) and adverse (1) 
and aggregated by the number of 
local governments in a province. 
4) According to some studies (e.g., 
Braun and Di Tella (2004), 
Treisman (2007), Bhattacharyya 
and Jha (2013), Liu and Lin 
(2012) and Masyitoh (2014)), the 
economic growth rate has a 
negative impact on corruption. 
This study will follow the studies 
of Bhattacharyya and Jha (2009) 
and Ekasani (2016) that measure 
the economic growth rate using 
the Gross Regional Domestic 
Product (GRDP), more 
specifically the GRDP in 2010 per 
capita in constant prices. Data 
come from the Indonesian Central 
Bureau of Statistics. The year 
2010 is the year of the latest 
survey which is conducted by 
them. 
5) According to Liu and Lin (2012), 
education level has an adverse 
effect on corruption. They choose 
the average length of schooling as 
a proxy for the education level, 
whereas research of Ekasani 
(2016) uses the human 
development index from the 
Indonesian Central Bureau of 
Statistics. This study will follow 
the research of Ekasani (2016) 
employing the human 
development index from the 
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Indonesian Central Bureau of 
Statistics. 
6) According to Liu and Lin (2012), 
the wage of public officials has a 
negative effect on the corruption 
level. Higher salary is assumed to 
cause less motivation to act 
corruptly. This study follows Liu 
and Lin (2012) in measuring 
relative public officials’ wage. 
We measure it by the total 
governments’ personnel 
expenditure of public officials 
divided by GRDP in each 
province. 
7) Prior studies do not show a 
consistent relationship between, 
government size and the level of 
corruption. Fisman and Gatti 
(2002) found a negative 
relationship, whereas the results 
of a study by Ali and Isse (2003) 
show a positive relationship. We 
will follow Liu and Lin (2012) in 
measuring the size of government 
with the ratio of government’s 
final consumption on GRDP in 
each province. 
8) The openness variable in 
researches of Gatti (2004) and 
Zhou and Tao (2009) has a 
negative relationship with the 
level of corruption. Countries or 
provinces with higher exports and 
imports are assumed to be less 
corrupt. We use the total amount 
of exports and imports adjusted 
by the province’s GRDP as in the 
research of Liu and Lin (2012). 
9) In the studies of Zhou and Tao 
(2009) and Wu and Rui (2010), 
market development has an 
adverse effect on the level of 
corruption. It means that a 
province with a higher market 
development tends to have less 
corruption. This study follows Liu 
and Lin (2012) by using the 
number employees of private 
companies divided by the total 
number of government staff in 
each province to measure market 
growth. 
10) Amount audited is measured by 
using the total actual revenue and 
expenditure of a province as a 
proxy, adjusted by population size 
following the Liu and Lin (2012). 
11) Auditor is the most important 
variable to investigate the quality 
of the audit. More qualified 
auditors will lead to a higher 
quality of the audit itself. It means 
that they can detect and report 
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fraud in a better way. This study 
follows Liu and Lin (2012) in how 
auditor is operationalized, but we 
will use the number of auditors in 
BPKP branch offices in each 
Indonesian province as they are 
the largest internal audit 
institution in Indonesia. 
 
D. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
We use data from 34 provinces 
in Indonesia during the period 2012-
2015. We exclude the province 
Jakarta because of its high values on 
almost all variables, making it an 
outlier. We also remove data from 
North Kalimantan since it has no 
complete data from 2012. Finally, the 
study obtains data from 32 provinces 
for four years observations, and it 
results in 128 province-year samples. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
 N Min Max Mean SD 
Corrupt_it 128 0.000 4.500 1.287 0.951 
FrAu_it_1 128 0.000 2.000 0.626 0.389 
FrAu_it 128 0.000 2.000 0.667 0.376 
AuOpi_it_1 128 1.8 4.0 3.2 0.3 
Growth_it 128 17120 1331418 219217 295273 
Educ_it 128 55.550 77.590 67.366 3.892 
Wage_it 128 1.376 15.105 5.929 3.151 
Govsize_it 128 3.960 42.600 13.885 8.303 
Open_it 128 19.650 326.490 102.568 51.456 
Market_it 128 7.651 59.281 21.075 10.455 
Amount_it 128 2870732.98 43794860.45 9474745.27 6480864.70 
Auditor_it 128 15.0 196.0 74.8 41.8 
As can be observed from the 
descriptive statistics (refer to Table 
1), the average number of corruption 
level in each province is 1.2875. It 
means that each local government 
experienced at least one case of 
corruption per year in the period of 
2012-2015. Irregularities found 
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through fraud audit finding of BPKP 
on average are 0.626 (it-1) and 0.667 
(it) which means the auditor could 
detect fraud in each of local 
government in a province 0.626 (it-1) 
or 0.667 (it) times. The average audit 
opinion received by local 
governments is 3.187 which means 
they obtain the qualified opinion of 
audit for their financial reports on 
average. 
 
Empirical Results
Table 2 Correlations 
 
Variables 
Corrup
t_it 
FrAu_i
t_1 
AuOpi
_it_1 
Growt
h_it 
Educ_i
t 
Wage_
it 
Govsiz
e_it 
Open_i
t 
Market
_it 
Corrupt_it 1.000 0.237 0.180 0.111 0.235 -0.058 -0.080 -0.107 0.093 
FrAu_it_1 0.237 1.000 0.241 0.169 0.371 -0.206 -0.233 0.006 0.138 
AuOpi_it_1 0.180 0.241 1.000 0.191 0.507 -0.306 -0.464 0.155 0.415 
Growth_it 0.111 0.169 0.191 1.000 0.214 -0.542 -0.524 -0.096 0.721 
Educ_it 0.235 0.371 0.507 0.214 1.000 -0.383 -0.421 0.416 0.292 
Wage_it -0.058 -0.206 -0.306 -0.542 -0.383 1.000 0.952 -0.247 -0.605 
Govsize_it -0.080 -0.233 -0.464 -0.524 -0.421 0.952 1.000 -0.196 -0.631 
Open_it -0.107 0.006 0.155 -0.096 0.416 -0.247 -0.196 1.000 0.068 
Market_it 0.093 0.138 0.415 0.721 0.292 -0.605 -0.631 0.068 1.000 
We checked our model for 
possible multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity, and 
autocorrelation problems (Gujarati, 
2003). It seems that the variables 
Wage and GovSize both have 
multicollinearity problems since the 
correlation between them is almost 1 
(refer to Table 2). Therefore, we 
deleted GovSize, which solved the 
multicollinearity problem. We did not 
find heteroscedasticity problems in 
the model after we perform Glejser’s 
heteroscedasticity test.  
We regress model 1 using SPSS 
and the result exhibits that the 
independent variables in the model 
simultaneously influence the 
dependent variable. The goodness of 
fit test to check the correlation 
between variables in the model shows 
an adjusted R squared value of 0.260. 
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It means the dependent variable in the 
model 1 can be explained by the 
independent variables as much as 
26% and the remaining is explained 
by other variables outside the model. 
The Anova F-value test results show 
that model 1 is significant. 
Furthermore, the fraud audit variable 
has a significant influence on the 
corruption level at the 5% level. The 
corruption level is positively 
influenced by irregularities found by 
a fraud audit report of BPKP from the 
previous year. This result supports 
our hypothesis that BPKP fraud audit 
finding of irregularities has a positive 
relationship with the corruption level 
in Indonesian provinces. The delay in 
the process of the fraud audit reports 
which are brought to the investigator 
or the court, thus adding the number 
of cases in the following year, 
becomes the cause of a positive 
relationship between fraud audit 
finding and the corruption level 
(Rosyadi, 2017). This result is 
consistent with the study of Liu and 
Lin (2012). 
The regression result of the 
model 1 can be seen in Table 3. 
Table 3 Regression result using Corrupt_it as dependent variable (Model 1)
 
Variables Expected Sign Corrupt_it 
Cons. ? -3.513** 
FrAu_it_1 + 0.458** 
AuOpi_it_1 - 0.287*** 
Growth_it - 2.068E-7 
Educ_it - 0.064** 
Wage_it - 0.038 
Open_it - -0.004** 
Market_it - -0.002 
Year dummies  Controlled 
N  128 
Adj R-squared  0.260 
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*Significance at the 1% 
**Significance at the 5% 
***Significance at the 10% 
 
Meanwhile, the opinion of audit from 
previous year received by local 
governments in this study has a significant 
effect on the corruption level. The study of 
the Masyitoh (2014) finds that audit opinion 
is negatively related with the corruption 
level whereas this study shows a positive 
relationship. It describes that the 
unqualified opinion does not always mean 
that the financial statement is free from 
fraud. An unqualified opinion is obtained 
when a financial statement is presented by 
fair presentation framework, and evidence 
gathered can give the auditor reasonable 
assurance that the financial statements are 
free from the material misstatement (Hayes, 
et al., 2014). It means there is a chance that 
the evidences not gathered in audit sampling 
contains fraud.  
Level of education is positively 
related to the corruption level which is 
consistent with Liu and Lin (2012). It shows 
that the higher education level in a province 
the higher the corruption level. This 
indicates that the perpetrators of corruption 
are well-educated people. Pradiptyo (2016) 
and Indonesian Corruption Watch (2017) 
state that the top perpetrators of corruption 
in Indonesia are educated people such as 
private businessmen, bureaucrats, member 
of parliaments and the head of regions. 
The result of this study also shows 
that the level of openness has a negative 
relationship with the corruption level. This 
result is consistent with the studies of Wu 
and Rui (2010) and Liu and Lin (2012). 
Local governments tend to be more 
transparent when they interact directly to 
other countries through exports and imports 
activities. Meanwhile, the other variables 
such as economic growth, relative wage of 
officials, and market development have no 
significant influence on the corruption level 
in this study. These results are not consistent 
with the studies of Liu and Lin (2012) and 
Wu and Rui (2010), but is in line with the 
study of Ekasani (2016). 
To investigate the reverse causality of 
corruption level on fraud audit finding, we 
regress model 2 following the study of Liu 
and Lin (2012). Liu and Lin (2012) argue 
that the corruption level could also 
influence fraud audit finding effort. There is 
a possibility that the fraud detection effort 
in the current year could be affected by the 
number of cases of corruption in the same 
period. However, we exclude the variable of 
the adoption rate of reports and newsletter 
delivered because of the data availability. 
The regression result shows that the model 
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could not reject our null hypothesis. It 
describes that the independent variables in 
model 2 are not able to explain fraud audit 
effort in the current year. This finding is not 
consistent with the research of Liu and Lin 
(2012). 
 
E. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS, 
LIMITATIONS, AND FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
Conclusion 
This study examines the role of BPKP 
as the internal auditor institution of the 
Indonesian President in detecting fraud, 
hereby investigating whether fraud audit 
finding influences the level of corruption in 
Indonesian provinces. It uses panel data 
from 128 observations province-year during 
the period 2012-2015. 
The results show that the hypothesis 
of this study is accepted. BPKP fraud audit 
finding of irregularities has a positive 
relationship with the corruption level in 
Indonesian provinces. This result confirms 
the research of Liu and Lin (2012) in saying 
that government fraud audit finding of 
irregularities is positively related to the 
level of corruption in the provincial-level 
governments. The more irregularities found 
through BPKP fraud audit, the more 
corruption cases can be revealed and can be 
used to measure the level of corruption in 
the provinces at the following year 
(Rosyadi, 2017). 
This study also discovers that audit 
opinion has a significant effect on the 
corruption level in Indonesian provinces. 
Unlike the study of Masyitoh (2014), this 
study finds a positive relationship between 
audit opinion and corruption level. 
Education and openness are 
significantly related to the level of 
corruption in this study. Education has a 
positive influence on the level of corruption. 
The higher the level of education in a 
province, the higher the number of 
corruption cases. It is shown that the actors 
of corruption are mostly educated people in 
bureaucracy, parliaments, private business, 
and local government. Moreover, the more 
open the provincial trading with the other 
countries through export and import 
activities, the lower the level of corruption. 
In this study, variables of growth, 
wage, and the market have no significant 
effect on the level of corruption. Economic 
growth, relative wage of public officials and 
market development are not determinants of 
corruption level based on this study finding.  
We also regressed a model to 
investigate the reverse causality between 
corruption level and fraud audit detection 
effort in the same year. In places with a 
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higher level of corruption, more effort will 
be needed to detect more fraud. Unlike the 
research of Liu and Lin (2012), this study 
could not find the evidence that effort to 
detect fraud is influenced by the corruption 
level. 
 
Implications 
This study’s results imply that fraud 
detection effort conducted by auditors of 
BPKP in the previous year is related with 
the level of corruption in Indonesian 
provinces. Based on the data acquired, fraud 
audit finding influences the level of 
corruption, which supports the hypothesis 
in this study. The performance of BPKP 
auditors in detecting fraud is associated 
with the number of corruption cases in the 
following year. The positive influence of 
fraud audit detection on the corruption level 
shows that the more irregularities found by 
BPKP auditors, the more cases of 
corruption can be revealed. It shows the 
effectiveness of BPKP activities as 
mandated by the President of Indonesia 
through President Law No. 192 The Year 
2014. 
 
Limitations 
There are some limitations related to 
this study despite the comprehensive 
results. Firstly, the level of corruption data 
is measured only by the number of cases 
that is brought to the Indonesian Supreme 
Court as the highest level of court. There is 
a possibility that corruption cases are dealt 
with at a lower court level. Secondly, the 
audit opinion variable is measured by the 
sum of opinions obtained by the local 
governments in a province from the lowest 
to the highest level of opinion. Therefore, 
we aggregate it with the number of local 
governments in a province. This 
aggregation leaves a confused result since 
there is the decimal amount in the audit 
opinion variable.  
 
Further Research 
This study can be improved by using 
a better measurement for some variables 
such as the corruption level and audit 
opinion. The level of corruption can also be 
measured by using data from Transparency 
International or by using a public integrity 
index. Corruption level data in the 
provincial level can also come from law 
enforcement institutions such as data from 
police and attorney institutions since they 
have the authority to investigate corruption 
cases. The audit opinion variable can also 
be measured using a dummy variable by 
dividing unqualified or non-unqualified 
opinion. It can give the significant different 
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result between the highest of audit opinion 
and others. 
We also recommend investigating 
corruption on the level of region since every 
region has its own data. It is also interesting 
to examine the political background of the 
head of the local government and the 
majority of political parliament party. The 
mayors and governors that have the same 
political background with the major party in 
local parliament are feared to have collusion 
to corrupt the local government’s budget. 
We can also include the capabilities of 
internal auditor institution of each local 
government to the model as a determinant 
of the corruption. It can give insight into the 
role of internal control to prevent 
corruption. The higher the capability of the 
local internal auditor, the less the region 
suffers from corruption. 
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